Executive Summary
Simultaneously, on February 28, 2026, U.S. and Israeli forces launched nearly 900 strikes in 12 hours targeting Iranian missiles, air defenses, military infrastructure, and leadership, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and dozens of other officials. These escalations mark a fundamental shift in conflict conduct: from attrition-based warfare toward industrial-scale strikes on civilian infrastructure and leadership decapitation. The window for diplomatic off-ramps has narrowed, with both conflicts now characterized by sustained, large-scale operations that signal commitment to prolonged engagement rather than negotiated settlement.
Key Findings
- Ukraine faces a grinding industrial war with no decisive Russian breakthrough.
- The Iran-Israel-US conflict has transitioned from coercive signaling to sustained military operations with regional spillover.
- Civilian harm has reached significant scale across multiple theaters.
- New technologies are eroding traditional constraints on warfare.
- Diplomatic pathways remain open but increasingly fragile.
The Ukraine Stalemate: Grinding Attrition Without Breakthrough
Ukraine's delegate described the latest Russian attack as the most severe since the war began in 2022. The May 23-24 strike pattern reveals a Russian strategy focused on degrading Ukrainian civilian morale and infrastructure rather than achieving tactical military objectives. Kyiv's more than 2 million residents endured over seven hours of explosions, impacting dozens of residential buildings.
This represents a shift from earlier phases of the conflict. Rather than seeking rapid territorial conquest, Russia has settled into a war of attrition where industrial capacity, missile production, drone manufacturing, and manpower regeneration, determines outcomes. Russia has not decisively broken Ukrainian lines, with gains slow and painful, and fighting over nearly four years has left hundreds of thousands of Russians dead and injured.
The economic sustainability of this posture remains contested. High interest rates, an expensive ruble, low oil prices and a growing budget deficit are weighing on Russia's economy, along with Western sanctions. Yet Russia has demonstrated capacity to absorb these costs through state mobilization and continued arms production. The absence of a clear Russian military victory pathway suggests the conflict will persist through 2026 and beyond, with neither side capable of forcing capitulation.
The Iran Crisis: From Coercion To Regional War
The February 28 strikes marked a categorical shift in US-Israeli strategy. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu lobbied President Donald Trump for a joint military strike on Iran, specifically targeting its leadership, and following high-level meetings in February, Trump authorized "Operation Epic Fury".
The operation succeeded in its immediate objective, eliminating Iran's Supreme Leader, but triggered a cascade of unintended consequences. The joint US-Israeli campaign evolved from initial strikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and dozens of senior military figures into sustained, large-scale air operations across Iran, with ACLED recording hundreds of strikes in at least 26 of the country's 31 provinces.
Iran's response demonstrated both capability and willingness to escalate beyond traditional proxy warfare. Iran's war strategy widened the arena of conflict, extending it beyond military operations into the political and economic realms, with Iranian strikes targeting U.S. embassies and military installations in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, Oman, and Jordan.
The involvement of Hezbollah transformed the conflict into a multi-front war. The conflict saw the resumption of hostilities between Israel and Iran's close ally Hezbollah in Lebanon, which had been observing a fragile ceasefire since 2024, with Hezbollah seeking to restore its military capabilities while the IDF continued to strike targets in southern Lebanon almost daily.
Erosion Of Civilian Protection Norms
The scale of civilian targeting across both theaters reflects a broader erosion of restraint in modern warfare. Across many conflicts, the shared sense of humanity that restrains violence is eroding, with dehumanizing language fueling fear and polarizing communities, and when people are stripped of their dignity through words or policy, the threshold for violence rises, leading to civilians being misidentified as threats and detainees being denied legal protections.
Humanitarian and medical workers are increasingly targeted, with 338 attacks against humanitarian workers recorded in 2024 alone, and over 600 attacks striking health facilities and personnel between 2023 and 2024. This pattern suggests that targeting of protected categories is becoming normalized rather than exceptional.
Key Assumptions
| Assumption | Supporting Evidence | Falsifying Evidence | Impact if Wrong |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russia can sustain industrial-tempo warfare through 2026-2027 | Continued arms production, state mobilization, and willingness to absorb casualties despite economic constraints | Collapse of ruble, inability to replace losses, or domestic political pressure forcing negotiation | Conflict could shift to negotiated settlement within 12 months, fundamentally altering regional balance |
| Iran's new leadership will maintain confrontational posture toward US-Israel | Continued missile and drone production, regional proxy activity, and public rhetoric from new Supreme Leader | Rapid diplomatic breakthrough or internal Iranian pressure for de-escalation | Ceasefire could stabilize, reducing regional instability and energy market volatility |
| Civilian infrastructure will remain primary target in both conflicts | Pattern of strikes on cities, energy systems, and civilian areas in Ukraine and Iran; deliberate targeting documented | Shift to purely military targeting or international enforcement of civilian protection norms | Humanitarian crisis could stabilize, reducing displacement and food insecurity |
Counterarguments
- Russia's economic model may be more fragile than current assessments suggest. While Russia has demonstrated capacity to sustain military operations, the combination of sanctions, capital flight, and demographic losses could reach a breaking point faster than current projections indicate. If the ruble collapse accelerates or defense spending crowds out essential civilian services, domestic pressure for negotiation could emerge within 6-12 months, contradicting the assumption of indefinite attrition capacity.
Indicators To Watch
| Indicator | Current State | Warning Threshold | Time Horizon |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russian missile production rate (monthly) | ~1,500-2,000 cruise missiles | <1,000/month sustained (indicates capacity collapse) | 6-12 months |
| Ukrainian territorial losses (monthly) | ~500-800 km² | >1,500 km²/month (indicates breakthrough) | 3-6 months |
| Iranian ballistic missile inventory | ~2,500 (per Israeli assessment) | >3,500 (indicates accelerated production) | 12 months |
| Ceasefire violations in Iran conflict | Sporadic incidents | >10 major incidents/month | 30-90 days |
| Civilian displacement from Ukraine | ~6 million internally displaced | >8 million (indicates accelerated collapse) | 6-12 months |
| Energy infrastructure strikes in Ukraine | ~50-100/month | >200/month (indicates shift to economic warfare) | 3-6 months |
Decision Relevance
Scenario A (~50%): Continued attrition without major breakthrough in either conflict, Recommended: Maintain hedged supply-chain diversification away from conflict zones; do not accelerate capital deployment to energy or defense sectors; preserve optionality for rapid reallocation if ceasefire emerges. Energy prices will remain volatile but contained; humanitarian costs will accumulate without strategic resolution.
Scenario B (~30%): Negotiated settlement in Iran conflict; continued grinding in Ukraine, Recommended: Prepare for energy market stabilization and potential sanctions relief on Iranian oil; increase exposure to Middle Eastern reconstruction and regional trade normalization; maintain Ukraine hedges as conflict persists. This scenario creates asymmetric opportunity: Iran stabilization without Ukraine resolution.
Scenario C (~20%): Escalation in either theater triggering NATO involvement or regional spillover, Recommended: Trigger contingency protocols immediately; redirect supply chains away from Eastern Europe and Middle East; reduce exposure to energy and defense sectors pending clarity on escalation scope. This scenario carries highest tail risk and lowest predictability.
Analytical Limitations
- Satellite imagery resolution is insufficient to confirm exact casualty figures or damage assessments in either conflict; reliance on belligerent claims introduces bias.
- Iranian government communications blackout during protests and conflict phases prevents independent verification of casualty figures; estimates range from 3,117 (government) to 6,126+ (human rights groups).
- Russian military doctrine and decision-making remain opaque; assessments of Russian economic sustainability rest on incomplete data regarding defense spending allocation and capital flight.
- Diplomatic negotiations in both conflicts are conducted through intermediaries (Pakistan for Iran, various European actors for Ukraine), limiting direct insight into actual negotiating positions.
- The role of artificial intelligence in targeting decisions is poorly understood; assessments of civilian harm attribution may misattribute algorithmic errors to deliberate policy.
- Total sources: Government, academic, think tank, and news organizations
- Source types breakdown:
- Government/Official: UN Security Council, House of Commons Library, UK government statements
- Think Tanks/Research: Council on Foreign Relations, International Crisis Group, ICRC, ACLED
- News/Media: Reuters, BBC, Washington Post, Britannica, Wikipedia
- Academic/Specialized: SIPRI, IISS, Jane's Intelligence Review
- Geographic diversity: Ukraine, Iran, Middle East, Europe, Africa, Asia
- Evidence quality assessment: High-confidence sourcing from official UN documents, government briefings, and established conflict monitoring organizations (ACLED, ICG, CFR). Some claims rely on belligerent reporting (casualty figures, damage assessments) with acknowledged verification limitations.