Executive Summary
Mexico's September 2024 National Guard constitutional reform exemplifies this trend, formally placing the civilian security force under military command and modifying Article 129 of the Constitution to permit broader military involvement in peacetime operations. This regional shift toward military deployment in domestic security reflects governments' responses to significant criminal threats but establishes concerning precedents that weaken civilian control, institutional checks, and democratic governance. The interplay between security crises and constitutional erosion creates cascading effects across multiple governance domains, as evidenced by similar developments in Ecuador, Argentina, and other regional states.
Key Findings
- Constitutional erosion of civilian oversight is accelerating across the region through targeted amendments to civil-military frameworks. Mexico's National Guard reform transfers command from civilian Public Safety Ministry to military-controlled Defense Ministry, while Ecuador's failed November 2025 referendum sought to overturn constitutional prohibitions on foreign military bases.
- Military roles are expanding beyond traditional security into civilian administration as governments delegate infrastructure construction, customs control, and prison management to armed forces. Mexico's military has assumed control of ports, airports, and major public works projects, while Ecuador's military oversees 11 of 34 prison facilities as of August 2025.
- Legislative changes are creating permanent institutional shifts rather than temporary emergency measures by embedding military authority in constitutional text. Mexico's Article 129 modification removes traditional peacetime restrictions, allowing armed forces to perform any activity "permitted by the Constitution and the laws."
- Regional precedent-setting is occurring through parallel constitutional processes as multiple countries simultaneously pursue military-friendly legal frameworks. The timing coincidence of Mexico's reform passage and Ecuador's attempted constitutional changes suggests coordinated or mutually reinforcing trends.
- Institutional checks and balances are weakening systematically as military expansion occurs alongside judicial attacks and legislative subordination. Ecuador's government organized demonstrations against Constitutional Court judges while attempting to bypass constitutional review processes.
Constitutional Frameworks Under Pressure
The transformation of civil-military relations centers on systematic modification of constitutional provisions that historically constrained military involvement in civilian affairs. Mexico's September 2024 reforms represent a significant example, with the Chamber of Deputies approving constitutional amendments 362-133 that place the National Guard under military control.
The most significant aspect involves modification of Article 129, which traditionally confined the army to barracks during peacetime. The reform removes this democratic safeguard by stipulating that armed forces can perform any functions "permitted by the Constitution and the laws," effectively providing carte blanche for military expansion. This change fundamentally alters the balance between civilian authority and military autonomy.
Ecuador's parallel attempt to modify constitutional constraints through a November 2025 referendum demonstrates regional coordination in weakening institutional barriers. Although Ecuadorian voters rejected proposals to permit foreign military bases by a 60% margin, the government proceeded with de facto military cooperation arrangements.
The Militarization Spectrum
Contemporary military deployment encompasses a spectrum from traditional security support to civilian administration. In Mexico, the National Guard reform creates a permanent militarized police force of approximately 120,000 personnel under Defense Ministry control, representing militarization of public security at the federal level.
This expansion extends beyond policing into economic infrastructure. Mexican armed forces control major ports, airports, customs operations, and construction projects including the controversial Tren Maya railway. According to the National Inventory of Militarization, Mexico witnessed 291 transfers of civilian functions and budgets to armed forces between 2006-2022.
Ecuador demonstrates similar patterns through its "Internal Armed Conflict" designation, which enables military involvement in prison administration and counter-narcotics operations. Since January 2024, soldiers have overseen 11 of 34 prison facilities, with monitors reporting corruption, incommunicado detention, and physical abuse.
Erosion Of Democratic Checks
The expansion of military authority coincides with systematic weakening of institutional oversight mechanisms. Mexico's reforms remove crucial constitutional limitations while expanding military jurisdiction into criminal investigations through the National Guard, creating potential for human rights violations.
Ecuador's approach demonstrates direct attacks on judicial independence. President Noboa organized public demonstrations against Constitutional Court judges and branded them "enemies of the people" when they struck down his power consolidation moves. The government attempted to bypass constitutional review processes required for referendum questions, demonstrating contempt for institutional procedures.
The timing of these constitutional modifications reflects coordinated erosion of democratic safeguards. As one analysis notes, "militarization now enshrined in the Constitution has potentially significant and uncertain consequences" for the balance between civilian and military spheres.
Regional Precedent And Spillover Effects
Latin American constitutional modifications create demonstration effects that encourage similar changes across the region. The Heritage Foundation identifies a clear trend among Latin American governments of expanding the domestic roles of their militaries in response to organized criminal threats that have overwhelmed civilian security forces.
This trend reflects both security pragmatism and institutional weakness. Countries like Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina historically maintained significant legal restrictions on the role of their militaries domestically in favor of civilian security forces, while Colombia, Peru, and Mexico developed substantial military roles in combating organized crime.
The precedent-setting power of constitutional changes extends beyond individual countries. Ecuador's failed referendum on foreign military bases, though unsuccessful, legitimized debate over constitutional constraints on military cooperation. The government proceeded with expanded U.S. military presence through "temporary" deployments under Status of Forces Agreements, circumventing constitutional prohibitions.
Implications For Regional Governance
The constitutional authorization of military deployment in domestic security establishes several concerning precedents for regional governance. First, it normalizes military solutions to civilian problems, creating dependency relationships where governments rely on armed forces rather than strengthening civilian institutions.
Second, the constitutional enshrinement of expanded military roles makes reversing these changes extremely difficult. Unlike legislative statutes or executive decrees, constitutional amendments require supermajorities or referenda to modify, creating institutional lock-in effects.
Third, the regional demonstration effect encourages similar constitutional modifications across Latin America. Countries facing comparable security challenges may view military deployment as a proven model rather than developing civilian capacity.
The interplay between economic pressures and security demands compounds these governance challenges. As economic constraints limit government capacity to fund adequate civilian police forces, military deployment becomes an attractive short-term solution with long-term institutional consequences.
Key Assumptions
| Assumption | Supporting Evidence | Falsifying Evidence | Impact if Wrong |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutional changes reflect permanent shifts rather than temporary emergency measures | Mexico's Article 129 modification removes traditional peacetime restrictions permanently | Governments could sunset military authorities or restore civilian control provisions | Analysis underestimates reversibility potential and overstates institutional damage |
| Regional governments coordinate or mutually reinforce military-friendly policies | Timing coincidence of Mexico reform passage and Ecuador referendum attempt | Countries could be responding independently to similar threats without coordination | Precedent-setting effects may be weaker than assessed |
| Military expansion undermines rather than strengthens democratic institutions | Human rights violations and attacks on judicial independence in Ecuador and Mexico | Military involvement could enhance state capacity and improve governance outcomes | Framework misidentifies military deployment as governance threat rather than solution |
Counterarguments
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Security pragmatism justifies constitutional modifications: Governments face significant criminal threats from transnational organized crime that civilian institutions cannot address effectively. Military deployment may represent rational adaptation to security realities rather than democratic erosion.
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Constitutional changes formalize existing practices: Many Latin American militaries already perform domestic security roles through informal arrangements or emergency measures. Constitutional authorization could enhance accountability and legal clarity.
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Institutional weakness predates military expansion: Civilian security forces lack capacity, funding, and expertise to address organized crime. Military involvement may compensate for institutional gaps rather than creating new vulnerabilities.
Indicators To Watch
| Indicator | Current State | Warning Threshold | Time Horizon |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutional amendments authorizing military deployment | Mexico completed, Ecuador failed | 3+ countries pass similar amendments | 12-18 months |
| Military control over civilian institutions | 11 of 34 prisons in Ecuador, multiple airports/ports in Mexico | Military control exceeds 30% of civilian infrastructure | 6-12 months |
| Attacks on judicial independence | Public demonstrations against courts in Ecuador | Government removes or threatens judges in 2+ countries | 6-9 months |
| Human rights violations by military forces | Documented cases in Ecuador and Mexico | UN or IACHR formal investigations in 3+ countries | 12 months |
| Regional demonstration effects | Constitutional debates in multiple countries | 2+ additional countries initiate constitutional reforms | 18-24 months |
Decision Relevance
Scenario A (~60%): Gradual constitutional erosion with military role expansion, Regional governments continue modifying constitutional frameworks to accommodate expanded military roles while maintaining democratic facades. Recommended: Monitor constitutional amendment processes, support civil society oversight mechanisms, and develop alternative civilian capacity-building programs.
Scenario B (~30%): Institutional resistance slows military expansion, Constitutional courts, civil society opposition, and international pressure constrain government attempts to expand military authority. Recommended: Support judicial independence initiatives and strengthen civilian institutions through technical assistance and funding.
Scenario C (~10%): Democratic reversal through military institutional capture, Military expansion accelerates beyond constitutional constraints, leading to de facto military control over civilian governance. Recommended: Implement defensive measures including economic restrictions and diplomatic pressure to prevent complete democratic breakdown.
Analytical Limitations
- Limited access to classified government documents makes assessing coordination between countries difficult
- Constitutional analysis focuses on formal legal changes rather than informal power relationships
- Regional variation in military professionalism and civil society strength affects implementation outcomes
- Economic data on military versus civilian security costs is unavailable for most countries
- Assessment relies heavily on Mexico and Ecuador cases, potentially missing important regional diversity
Sources & Evidence Base
- Ungraded
- Mexico: Public Security Under Military Control | Wilson Center
wilsoncenter.org
- Ungraded